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Priority No. 2 
Case No. 940738-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On August 11, 1994, defendant pled guilty to issuing a bad check, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1995), a third-degree felony (R. 100). Therefore, this 
Court has original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1994). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Does section 76-6-505, criminalizing the issuance of bad checks, violate 
defendant's rights to due process or equal protection? This Court reviews a trial court 
order regarding a statute's constitutionality for correction of error, giving no deference 
to the lower court's ruling. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1995) reads as follows: 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, 
for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any 
money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the 
drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which 
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be 
paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, 
for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any 
money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is 
guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to the 
payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual 
notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not more than $200, 
such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a 
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $200 but not more than 
$300, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a 
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $300 but not more than 
$1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a 
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense shall 
be a second degree felony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
As the result of a conditional plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count 
of issuing a bad check, in violation of section 76-6-505 (R. 89-91). In exchange, the 
State dismissed a count of communications fraud, j&, and agreed to defendant's being 
allowed to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the bad check statute (R. 91). 
On September 26, 1994, the trial court stayed defendant's zero to five-year prison 
sentence and placed her on probation (R. 100). 
Statement of the facts 
No facts appear in the record to illuminate the particular circumstances for 
defendant's charge and plea of guilt. However, during the plea proceeding, defendant 
admitted that she passed a series of bad checks totaling approximately $400 to obtain 
property or other things of value and that the bank upon which the checks were drawn 
refused to pay them due to insufficient funds (Tr. August 11, 1994 at 9). Defendant 
further admitted that, even though she received notice from the bank that the checks 
had not been paid, she refused to pay them within fourteen days of receiving the notice 
(i£L). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 76-6-505 is not constitutionally infirm. Under the "void for vagueness" 
doctrine, a statute survives review if it sufficiently explains what conduct is prohibited 
so that the reader of average intelligence is able to change his conduct to comply with 
societal expectations. Subsection (1) of the challenged statute makes it an offense for a 
3 
person to write a check for a thing of value knowing that the check will not be paid. 
Subsection (2) informs the reader that he has fourteen days to pay a dishonored check 
after receiving notice that the bank has legally refused to honor it. Both provisions 
expressly and clearly tell the citizen what he has to do to avoid committing criminal 
conduct Nor is the statute void because it fails to include an "intent to defraud'' 
element. This Court previously ruled that the legislature specifically took out that 
intent requirement and, therefore, knowledge suffices. 
The bad check statute does not give unfettered discretion to a bank to determine 
whether to pay a check or not. A bank's ability to dishonor a check is constrained not 
just by any contract the account-hold may have with the bank, but with state and federal 
regulations, including the Uniform Commercial Code. Whether a bank has legally 
refused to pay a check is a legal question requiring a court to examine contracts and 
statutes. This is not a difficult or ambiguous adventure for a trial court, given the 
myriad of cases of a more complex nature routinely decided by courts and juries. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH'S BAD CHECK STATUTE SUFFICIENTLY 
INFORMS THE READER THAT IT IS ILLEGAL TO 
REFUSE TO PAY A DISHONORED CHECK WITHIN 
FOURTEEN DAYS OF RECEIVING NOTICE OF 
NONPAYMENT; THEREFORE, IT IS NOT VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
The State's obligation to inform its citizens of the laws they must obey is an 
essential mandate of due process. Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 
(1971); West Valley City v. Streeter. 849 P.2d 613, 515-16 (Utah App. 1993). Laws 
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that are written in such a vague and ambiguous manner as I - prevail (he average person 
from understanding what c 'iiitiid is allowed and what is not would allow the laws to be 
arbitrarily and capriciously enforced. As the United States Supreme Court said in 
Graynefl: aVague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning A 
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters es 
fi)i icMiiitifioii in* .in (id hoc .Hid subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application." 408 U.S. at 108-109. To prevent these dangers, the 
legislature must write laws that are "sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader 
what conduct is prohibited." West Vallev Citv v. Streeter Because 
language is noi precise, suiiuies taiiiioi he drawn with absolute precision. The test for 
any statute is one of reason: can the average citizen understand what the law tells him 
he cannot do, thus giving him the ability to conform his conduct to society's 
expectations. Grayned. 408 U.S. at 110 ("Condemned to "tic use o) wonh , \uj can 
nevei expeui iiiathciiiatical certainly from mi language.'"). 
Though perhaps not as precise as a scientific equation, section 76-6-505 states, 
as well as words allow, that it is a crime to issue a bad check. With unnecessary words 
stricken, the law makes two separate criminal offenses 
r pass a check; (b) to obtain money, property, or 
other thing of value; (c) if he knows the check will not be paid and it is, in fact, not 
paid. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1995). As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in 
State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983), offense in 
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subsection (1) is the actual writing and passing of the check by a person who knows it 
will not be paid. 
Subsection (2) penalizes a person who fails to pay a check that has been 
dishonored within fourteen days of receiving notice of nonpayment. This provision 
recognizes that people make innocent mistakes in balancing their checkbooks and that 
they may mistakenly believe that the bank will pay.1 State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 
352, 354 (Utah 1986). Here, defendant apparently pled guilty to violating subsection 
(2), even though she was originally charged with violating both sections (Tr. August 
11, 1994 at 9). 
Both parts of section 76-6-505 are sufficiently explicit and precise. Subsection 
(1) criminalizes the act of passing a check that the writer knows will bounce; therefore, 
the criminal act occurs when the writer passes the check. Subsection (2) criminalizes 
the act of refusing to pay a check that has been lawfully dishonored within 14 days of 
receipt of the dishonor; here, the criminal act occurs on the 15th day after receiving the 
dishonor notice. Defendant argues that the term "legally refused" is vague. However, 
the validity of a bank's refusal to pay a check is neither vague nor an act of complete 
discretion. The bank's power to refuse payment is governed by a contractual 
1
 Interestingly, other states make a person's failure to pay the check after receiving notice 
of dishonor a presumption that the drawer knew the check would not be paid. £££ Commonwealth v. 
Mutnik. 406 A.2d 516, 517 (Penn. 1979); Model Penal Code 224.5 (ALI 1980). Still other states make 
payment of the check within a certain period of time an affirmative defense. State v. Laude. 654 P.2d 
1223, 1226-27 (Wyo. 1982). However, this statute criminalizes the act of passing a bad check with 
knowledge that it would not be paid and the separate act of refusing to pay a check that was legally 
dishonored after receiving actual notice of nonpayment. 
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relationship, statutes, and regulations, which both parties piesumabl> know , and Utiii a 
court i:.ji] easily discern. 
Section 76-6-505 is as explicit and clear as the ordinance this Court upheld in 
Streeter against a vagueness challenge. There, a city ordinance made it unlawful uto 
raise, keep or use any animal, fowl in bird loi ilie pin pose, ot fighting or baiting. . . ." 
Streeter. 849 P.2d at This Court specifically ruled that the ordinance provided 
adequate notice to the ordinary reader that conduct such as the defendant's, i.e., 
keeping birds for fighting, was prohibited. I$L Section 76-6-505 is similarly clear and 
informative; therefore, the trial < .on to dismiss the 
information ground. See &&Q State v. Laude. 654 P.2d at 1228-29 (Wyoming's 
bad check statute sufficiently informed citizen of prohibited conduct). 
EL AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NOT NEEDED TO 
ESTABLISH COMMISSION OF A CRIME, 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL ON THIS 
ISSUE IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Contrary to established Utah law, defendant claims that the bad check statute is 
void because it does not require an intent to defraud. Br. of Defendant at 1, 6-8. 
Subsection (2), the provision to which defendant pled guilty, however, does n »i require 
aspeciiu minimi, eitlici ml hiowlalju' oi am untnil luilciruiitl Because the statute 
contains no specific mens rea and is not designated a strict liability crime, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995), allows the State to establish criminal responsibility by showing 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Because defendant's case did not gt 
cannot However, 
7 
subsection 76-6-505(2) at least requires that defendant knew the bank had dishonored 
the check because it does require that the defendant receive actual notice. See State v. 
Delmotte. 665 P.2d at 1315 (Utah 1983) (intent to defraud not needed to establish 
violation of subsection 76-6-505(1)); M11&&, 406 A.2d at 517-518 (deletion of "intent 
to defraud" showed that knowledge was sufficient culpability level).2 To defendant's 
policy-based argument that no one can be penalized for issuing a bad check, or failing 
to pay a dishonored check after notice, unless there is an intent to defraud, Delmotte is 
binding, adverse precedent. Passing a bad check with the purpose to defraud may 
constitute a separate, more serious crime, but it is not the only crime that the legislature 
can prohibit in this area.3 
ffl. DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO PAY A DISHONORED 
CHECK WAS THE BASIS FOR HER CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY, NOT THE BANK'S "UNFETTERED 
DISCRETION" TO HONOR THE CHECK. 
Defendant cites no authority for the general proposition that, in a criminal 
prosecution, it violates due process for a third party to initiate a criminal action. It is 
possible that many crimes are committed yet never reported to the police. Victims of 
2
 Responding to a trend in developing state laws, the drafters of the Model Penal Code also 
adopted knowledge as the level of culpability in its suggested bad check statute. Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries (Official Draft & Revised Comments) § 224.5, at 317 (ALI 1980) (lower culpability levels 
a common feature of recently drafted bad check laws.) 
3
 The Model Penal Code commentary points out that bad check statutes with intent to defraud 
culpability levels generally were drafted earlier, when the evil sought to be remedied was the check writer's 
effect upon the person who received the check. Model Penal Code and Commentary (Official Draft & 
Revised Comments) at 317-18 (ALI 1980). The model code, and other states, now see the primary evil as 
the "perversion of the flow of commercial paper."Id.: Mutnik. 406 P.2d at 518, n.2. Analytically, these 
statutes are coming closer to regulatory offenses that approach strict liability; thus, a reduction in the level 
of culpability is reasonable. 
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theft may decline to involve the police if they get their property back within a certain 
period of time, especially when the thief is a icLnh c 01 annraintunec Thai victim Ins 
discretion to accept on return of property in lieu of initiating prosecution. This 
inherent grant of discretion does not violate a perpetrator's due process rights, but only 
recognizes general social conduct. Subsection 76-6-505(2) formalizes this arrangement 
in the context of bad checks and gives a defendai ; 
prosecution. Hie provision actually restricts the payee's ability to initiate prosecution 
and gives a defendant the benefit of the doubt and a two-week redemption window. 
Further, the bank's ability to dishonor a check is not without fetters but is determined 
by a pre-existing contract, statutes, and government regul 
§ 70A 1-501 (Snpp l(w.| > (Uniform Commercial Code). The ultimate decision to 
charge is always left to the prosecutor, just as the ultimate power to convict is left to 
the jury or the judge. 
IV. DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE LEGAL 
CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS THIS COURT 
UNABLE TO REVIEW ON APPEAL THE ISSUE 
WHETHER SECTION 76-6-505(2) CONSTITUTES 
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. 
Defendant's "argument" regarding imprisonment for debt consists of one quote 
from a Colorado case and two conclusory sentences lir of Defendant ill S, "li' 111 Hie 
i i lie s of appellate procedure expressly require that a brief include an argument that 
"shall include the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
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Utah R. App. P. 24(i) (1995). Defendant's brief does not comply with this 
requirement; therefore, due to the lack of any legal analysis, the Court should refuse to 
review this issue. State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-49 (Utah App. 1992). 
V. BECAUSE THE PRESUMPTION CREATED IN 
SECTION 76-6-505(2) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
OFFENSE TO WHICH SHE PLED GUILTY, SHE 
CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF ITS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY ON APPEAL. 
Subsection 76-6-505(1) contains a presumption that a person who issues a check 
or draft on a nonexistent account knew that the check would not be paid. However, 
defendant did not plead guilty to violating this subsection. She specifically pled guilty 
to failing to pay checks within fourteen days of receiving notice that they had been 
dishonored, in violation of subsection (2) (Tr. August 11 at 9). In substance then, 
defendant's attempt to appeal language regarding the presumption constitutes an 
invitation to write an advisory opinion on a hypothetical problem. Black v. Alpha 
Financial Corp.. 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah 1982) (court will not issue advisory 
opinions). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's guilty plea should be affirmed. 
10 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Because the 1 acts and k^ ial argument are adequately presented in the briefs, oral 
argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS M±kzy of June 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
1 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two (2) copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, by U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
ARDEN W. LAURITZEN 
610 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
.im^A^iJk 
1 
/^JWo 
12 
